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Abstract. We introduce the notion of security-mediated certificateless
(SMC) cryptography. This allows more lightweight versions of mediated
cryptography while maintaining the ability for instantaneous revocation
of keys. Moreover, our solutions avoid key escrow, which has been used
in all previous mediated cryptography algorithms. We provide a model of
security against a fully-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacker, who may be
a rogue key generation centre or any coalition of rogue users. We present
a generic construction and also a concrete algorithm based on bilinear
pairings. Our concrete scheme is more efficient than the identity-based
mediated encryption scheme of Baek and Zheng in PKC 2004 which is
provably secure in a comparable security model. In addition, our propos-
als can be easily extended to support distributed security mediators.
Keywords: security-mediated cryptography, certificateless cryptography
1 Introduction
During the 1980s and 1990s elaborate schemes for certification of public keys,
including many standardised solutions, seemed to be moving towards a world-
wide public key infrastructure (PKI). However, in recent years it has been widely
recognised that this infrastructure has more problems than was at first realised.
Business confidence in public key infrastructure has faltered. Apart from the
many commercial, legal and political issues, a recurring dilemma has been how
best to manage the processing, storage and revocation of public key certificates.
Public key revocation. The need to be able to revoke public keys was recog-
nised early in the development of public key infrastructure. It seems inevitable
that on occasions some private keys will become compromised and in such a case
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it is no longer safe to use the corresponding public key. Initial solutions relied
on certificate revocation lists (CRLs) similar to the idea of black lists for credit
cards. The difficulty of managing CRLs has led to alternative revocation solu-
tions [7, 12], many of which rely on some on-line checking. As modern networks
become more widely available and reliable, use of on-line servers becomes much
more realistic than it was several years ago.
Mediated cryptography was designed by Boneh, Ding and Tsudik [7] as a
method to allow immediate revocation of public keys. They suggest that such a
scheme is particularly useful in government, corporate or military environments,
where there may be an unexpected and immediate requirement to revoke a key
when a user suspects key compromise, or when a user is removed from a position
of authority. Previous revocation techniques cannot satisfy this requirement.
The basic idea of mediated cryptography is to use an on-line mediator for every
transaction. This on-line mediator is referred to as a SEM (SEcurity Mediator)
since it provides a control of security capabilities. If the SEM does not cooperate
then no transactions with the public key are possible any longer. Once the SEM
is notified that a user’s key is to be revoked its use can be immediately stopped.
Identity-based cryptography. Many recent research proposals have fo-
cussed on developing public key systems that avoid the use of certificates al-
together. The impetus for this trend has largely come from the realisation that
the use of pairings on elliptic curves opens up many new options that were not
available before. The primary step in this direction was taken by Boneh and
Franklin [8] who showed that identity-based cryptography could be practically
achieved through use of pairings. Instead of using public keys and certificates,
any identity string can take the place of both. Anyone can encrypt a message
intended for the entity described by the identity string.
Identity-based cryptography does not solve the revocation problem. Indeed,
in some sense it can be argued to make the situation worse since how can a
person revoke his own identity? A pragmatic way to deal with this problem is to
notice that the identity string can include any additional information, including
a validity period. To manage revocation in identity-based cryptosystems, short
validity periods may be encoded into the identity string. However, this does
not fit an environment where immediate revocation may be required. Ding and
Tsudik [10] therefore proposed a combined scheme providing both identity-based
key and security-mediated feature.
Escrow problem. Amajor drawback of all identity-based and security-mediated
cryptosystems so far proposed is that they require a trusted third party to gen-
erate keys for all entities. This is widely known as the escrow problem. Absolute
trust is placed in the third party, who could decrypt any message or sign on be-
half of any entity. Partial solutions have been proposed to the escrow problem,
particularly by distributing the power of the third party over several entities. The
problem is present in a particularly acute way in Ding and Tsudik’s identity-
based mediated cryptography; compromise of the SEM gives away all messages
ever encrypted for every party.
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Recently there have been schemes proposed to overcome the escrow problem
in a more complete way. Certificateless cryptography proposed by Al-Riyami and
Paterson [2] is a hybrid between identity-based schemes and traditional schemes
using public key certificates. Entities have public keys but they do not have
certificates. Instead the identity string is used to ensure that only the correct
entity can be in possession of the private key corresponding to the public key.
The scheme is attractive, but does not address how to provide instant revocation
when desired. This is the problem that we solve in this paper.
Contributions. We introduce the notion of Security-Mediated Certificateless
(SMC) cryptography. The major properties that the proposed notion achieve are:
– no certificates are used (in contrast with PKI-based schemes).
– user private keys are not escrowed (in contrast with identity-based schemes).
– instant revocation is provided (in contrast with certificateless schemes).
No previously proposed cryptosystem can provide all these properties together.
We first provide a generic construction for security-mediated certificateless en-
cryption. Then we provide a concrete scheme for security-mediated certificateless
encryption with better efficiency (and also signature schemes) based on pairings.
Security proof in the random oracle model is given. Our concrete scheme has the
following properties:
– it is secure in a powerful security model against a fully adaptive rogue key
generation centre, or any coalition of fully adaptive rogue users, which can
replace the public key of any user and ask for decryption oracle queries even
when the public key is replaced.
– it is more efficient3 than the known identity-based mediated scheme in a
similar security model.
– it can be extended to support distributed SEMs, essential for availability.
Paper structure. In the following section we compare related proposals’
properties with our proposal. Section 3 discusses the building blocks used by
our proposals. The security model for our proposed notion of security-mediated
certificateless encryption is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 details our generic
construction. In Section 6 a concrete scheme from pairings achieving a higher
efficiency than the generic construction is proposed. Finally we conclude our
work and discuss some future work of SMC cryptography.
2 Related Work
Our new cryptographic model has strong similarities to a number of previous
proposals. It is important to understand our contribution in the context of this
previous work. Before discussing each of these in turn we consider a number of
prominent features which can be used to differentiate the various models.
3 Our concrete scheme is not a trivial extension from existing identity-based medicated
scheme and existing certificateless public key encryption scheme.
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SEM free. We use this term to indicate that a scheme does not use a security
mediator. Generally we may regard this feature as an advantage.
Predefined keys. In traditional public key systems, public and private keys
generally need to be generated together. An attractive feature of identity-
based and related schemes is that encryption can be done before the cor-
responding private key has been generated. As discussed in [2], this allows
“cryptographic work-flow”, such that one must satisfy some condition in or-
der to perform a certain cryptographic function (e.g. encryption). We say
a system has predefined keys if part of the key can be predefined, which is
sufficient for the interesting applications based on control of work-flow.
Instant revoke. As already discussed, in some applications it is important to
have the feature to instantly revoke public keys.
Escrow free. Escrow freeness means the user’s secret is not (completely) com-
putable by a certain party other than the user. As discussed previously,
identity-based cryptography and some related schemes do not achieve this
property since they require some (possibly distributed) third party to com-
pute all entities’ secrets. The scheme in [7] is also not escrow free since the
private key is not generated by the user (a single party generates the RSA
modulus for all users).
Implicit certificates. Explicit certificates are required for conventional public
key systems. We say that a scheme has implicit certificates if there is no need
for users of public keys (e.g. the sender of the message being encrypted) to
use an explicit certified string. An implication is that there is no need for
on-line verification of certificates. Another advantage of implicit certificates
is a saving in storage and bandwidth.
We will consider the relevant previous work next in the context of these
important features. Table 1 summarises which schemes provide which features.
Notice that no scheme can satisfy all features at once, and therefore our security-
mediated certificateless cryptography can be considered as a new compromise
between the various desirable features.
SEM Predefined Instant Escrow Implicit
Free Keys Revoke Free Certificates
Identity-based (ID-based) [8] 3 3 8 8 3
Certificateless [2] 3 3 8 3 3
Certificate-based [12] 3 3 8 3 3
Security-mediated [7] 8 8 3 8 8
ID-based security-mediated [10,16] 8 3 3 8 3
Security-mediated Certificateless 8 3 3 3 3
Table 1. Properties of related paradigms
Certificateless cryptography. Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] proved that
their encryption scheme provides a strong form of chosen ciphertext security.
They also provide a key agreement protocol, and a hierarchical encryption scheme
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in the same model, although none of these extras comes with a formal secu-
rity analysis. The signature scheme they proposed is later found to be insecure
by [14]. More efficient constructions of certificateless public key encryption were
proposed subsequently [1,3,9,18]. The improved encryption scheme by Al-Riyami
and Paterson [3] is broken and fixed by Zhang and Feng [21].
It is possible to extend certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) to
a security-mediated one which entails keeping the public key constant while
requiring the encryption algorithm to append a changing information such as
the current time period to the identifier of the recipient. The corresponding
partial private key can then be issued instead of the partial decryption as used in
our scheme. This has similar interaction to our scheme. However, an important
limitation of this solution is that the key generation centre needs to remain
virtually permanently on-line. The point is that the master secret is needed
for the creation of a huge number of partial private keys associated with the
fine-grained time intervals. Moreover, this requires every sender to know what
“changing information” should be used for each recipient every time, which is
not a trivial assumption. In contrast, the mediators in our scheme do not use the
master secret and so compromise of one mediator does not affect other mediators
or the master secret. Besides, the identifier in our scheme remains unchanged.
The PhD thesis of Al-Riyami [1, Section 4.6.1] suggested a way to provide
revocation in certificateless cryptography which entails changing the private key
(and hence the public key) of the system at regular time intervals. The encryption
algorithm must then retrieve the latest system parameters. Again, an important
limitation of this solution is that the key generation centre needs to go on-line
at the start of each time period. We also remark that Al-Riyami provides no
formal model or proof for such a scenario.
Distributed SEM. In any security-mediated schemes, every decryption must
involve the help of an on-line SEM, distributing SEM-key across multiple SEMs
is essential to ensure availability. Distributing duplicated copies of SEM-key may
not be desirable since it introduces more sites for attacker to compromise. One of
the standard solutions is to apply threshold cryptography to distribute the SEM-
key. In [20], apart from assigning one of the SEMs to hold the original SEM-key,
the SEM-key is replicated in the form of a number of shares across multiple
SEMs. However, their solution have not considered obtaining partial token from
the SEMs holding a share of the SEM-key. Instead, once the initial SEM (holding
the original SEM-key) is temporary unavailable, SEM-key migration occurs. The
SEM-key is reconstructed from the shares, resulting in an extra copy of a SEM-
key. We will show how distributing of SEM-keys is possible for all our proposal.
3 Preliminaries
We review some general notions about public key encryption, one-time signature
and identity-based encryption, which will be used in our generic construction.
The cryptographic primitive used by our concrete scheme will also be discussed.
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3.1 Public key encryption
Let PKE = (PKE.Gen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) be a (standard) public key encryp-
tion scheme consists of the key generation algorithm PKE.Gen, the encryption
algorithm PKE.Enc and the decryption algorithm PKE.Dec. PKE.Gen takes as an
input security parameter 1k and outputs a encryption/decryption key pair (EK,
DK). PKE.Enc is a randomized algorithm taking EK, a label ` and a message m
as input, outputs a ciphertext C. PKE.Dec is a deterministic algorithm taking
DK, a ciphertext C and a label `, outputs a message m or ⊥ if C is invalid. We
require E to be correct, i.e. PKE.Dec`DK(PKE.Enc`EK(m)) = m for all message m
and for all (EK,DK) generated by PKE.Gen. We also require PKE to be secure
against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, adapted to deal with labels [19].
3.2 One-time signature
Let S = (SGen, Sig, Vfy) be a public key signature scheme consists of the key
generation algorithm SGen, the signing algorithm Sig and the verification algo-
rithm Vfy. SGen takes as an input security parameter 1k and outputs a sign-
ing/verification key pair (SK, VK). Sig takes SK and a message m as input,
outputs a signature σ. Vfy is a deterministic algorithm taking VK, a message m
and a signature σ, outputs > or ⊥ depending whether the signature is valid. S
should be correct such that VfyVK(SigSK(m)) = > for all message m and for all
(SK,VK) generated by SGen. For security, we assume S is strongly unforgeable
(cannot create a new valid signature even for previously-signed messages) under
adaptive chosen-message attacks. We refer one-time signature schemes as a class
of signature schemes with a slightly modified security model that an adversary
can only request a signature on a single message.
3.3 Identity-based encryption
In 1984, Shamir [17] introduced the idea of identity-based cryptosystem. An
identity-based encryption IBE consists of four algorithms: IBE.Set, IBE.Gen,
IBE.Enc and IBE.Dec. In essence, IBE.Set takes as an input security parame-
ter 1k, outputs common public parameters params and master secret master-
key. For simplicity we omit the inclusion of params in the description of the
remaining algorithm. IBE.Gen takes user’s identity ID, and master-key as input
and generates the private key DID for each user; IBE.Enc produces the cipher-
text C by taking the recipient’s identity ID, and the message m as input. Fi-
nally, IBE.Dec recovers the original message by taking the recipient’s private
key DID, and the ciphertext C as input. We require the scheme to be correct,
i.e. IBE.DecDID(IBE.EncID(m)) = m for all messages m and all ID such that
DID = IBE.Genmaster−key(ID). We assume IBE is secure against chosen-ciphertext-
and-identity attack. By chosen-identity attack we mean the adversary can ask
for the private key of any chosen identities except the one in the challenge.
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3.4 Bilinear pairings and related problems
We provide a brief overview of the main definitions and notation for bilinear
maps based on elliptic curve pairings. More details and implementation options
can be found in many recent papers [6, 8]. We also provide definitions for the
BDH problem used by Al-Riyami and Paterson [2]. Using the notation of Boneh
and Franklin [8], we let G1 be an additive group of prime order q and G2 be a
multiplicative group also of order q. We assume the existence of an efficiently
computable bilinear map e : G1×G1 → G2. Typically, G1 will be a subgroup of
the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, G2 will be a subgroup
of the multiplicative group of a related finite field, and eˆ will be derived from
the Weil or Tate pairing on the elliptic curve. We assume that an element P ∈
G1 satisfying eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1G2 is known. By eˆ being bilinear, we mean that for
Q,W,Z ∈ G1, both eˆ(Q,W+Z) = eˆ(Q,W ) · eˆ(Q,Z) and eˆ(Q+W,Z) = eˆ(Q,Z) ·
eˆ(W,Z). When a ∈ Zq and Q ∈ G1, we write aQ for Q added to itself a − 1
times, also called scalar multiplication of Q by a. As a consequence of bilinearity,
for any Q,W ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zq: eˆ(aQ, bW ) = eˆ(Q,W )ab = eˆ(abQ,W ).
Throughout this paper we assume that suitable groups G1 and G2, a map eˆ
and an element P ∈ G1 have been chosen, and that elements of G1 and G2 can
be represented by bit strings of the appropriate lengths.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman(BDH) Problem: Let G1, G2, P and eˆ be as above.
The BDH problem in 〈G1,G2, e〉 is as follows: Given 〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉 with a, b, c ∈
Z∗q , compute eˆ(P, P )abc ∈ G2. An algorithm A has advantage  in solving the
BDH problem if Pr
[A(〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉) = eˆ(P, P )abc] = . Here the probability
is measured over random choices of a, b, c in Z∗q and the random bits of A.
4 Security-Mediated Certificateless Cryptography
Security-mediated certificateless encryption is a seven-tuple (Setup, Set-Private-
Key, Set-Public-Key, Register-Public-Key, Encrypt, SEM-Decrypt, User-Decrypt).
The players are the key generation centre (KGC), security mediators (SEMs)
and a set of users. The KGC runs the setup phase. It takes a security parameter
k as input and generates system parameters (we omit the inclusion of system
parameters as the input of the rest of the algorithms). A master-key s that is
used to generate a SEM-key is randomly selected.
Following this users can generate their private and public key pairs, using
Set-Private-Key and Set-Public-Key. Users need to register their identities and the
public keys with the KGC by Register-Public-Key, which is a protocol initiated
by the user. This requires the KGC to identify the user and receive an authentic
version of the public key. At the same time the user must prove knowledge of the
private key corresponding to its public key, although the value of the private key
remains secret to the user. The KGC then uses the master secret s to generate
the SEM-key required during decryption time by the SEM. This key needs to be
authentically and confidentially transferred to the SEM. It is quite possible for
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one user to register different public keys (or even the same one) with multiple
SEMs. Notice that SEMs are not given access to the master secret s at any time.
Encrypt takes a message, an identity and a registered public key to produce
the corresponding ciphertext. SEM-Decrypt is executed by the SEM using the
SEM-key to do the partial decryption for the user. Finally User-Decrypt takes
the partial decryption results and the user’s private key to get back the message.
4.1 Security model
Existing security-mediated schemes are of different security levels. The identity-
based scheme of Ding and Tsudik [10] uses a common RSA modulus for all users,
and hence a collusion between a user and the SEM would result in a total break
of the scheme. So the security of the scheme requires a strong assumption that
the SEM is totally trusted or remains secure throughout the life of the system.
The security model used by Libert and Quisquater [16] has the restriction
that the adversary cannot ask for the private key (i.e. the adversary can still ask
for the SEM-key) of the target user in the challenge phase of the game. Although
their scheme do not have the drawback of Ding and Tsudik’s [10], trust is moved
to the user as the scheme is insecure against chosen-ciphertext attack by the
attacker who possesses the user part of the private key. Since it is assumed that
the adversary do not equipped with the user part of the private key, the notion
is termed as weak semantic security against insider attacks. Generally speaking,
it is easier for an attacker to compromise the key for users’ side than the SEM’s
one. The assumption is still a strong one.
We use a similar security model to that used by the identity-based scheme of
Baek and Zheng [5], which is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack by insiders.
However, a more powerful adversary should be considered in our scenario. The
differences are firstly that we allow the adversary access to the master secret s,
and secondly that we provide extra queries which allow the adversary to extract
and replace public keys. No such queries are relevant to schemes in [5, 16] since
identities are used in place of public keys.
The security model also reflects the similarity with Al-Riyami and Paterson’s
certificateless encryption [2]. An adversary against our scheme should be allowed
to make a number of queries. Some of these are the same as those used in
the CL-PKE model but we also need to allow queries for partial and complete
decryption. The following are the queries available to the adversary. There are
some restrictions on when these can be used which will be detailed below.
1. Extract SEM-key: On input an identity IDA the adversary is returned
with DA, which is the key held by SEM for doing the partial decryption on
behalf of the user A.
2. Request public key: On input an identity IDA the adversary obtains user
A’s public key PA
3. Replace public key: On input an identity IDA and a valid public key PA,
the public key of A is replaced by this new one (and the SEM-key is also
updated if the system bundles the public key with the identifier for SEM-key
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creation). The replaced version will be used in the rest of the game (unless
replaced again), e.g. the User decrypt query to be described below.
4. Extract private key: On input an identity IDA, the adversary gets user
A’s private key xA. This query is reasonably disallowed if the public key of
A has already been replaced by the adversary.
5. SEM decrypt: On input a ciphertext C and identity IDA, the adversary is
returned with the partial decryption result C ′ by using the SEM-key DA.
6. User decrypt: On input a ciphertext C ′ and an identity IDA, the adversary
is returned with the decryption of C ′ (which could, of course, be simply ⊥).
Similar to the proof of security for CL-PKE in [2], we have the luxury of
allowing this query even in the case that the public key of A has been replaced
by the adversary.
7. Complete decrypt: It can be done by executing the above two queries in
sequence, subject to the restriction (if any) imposed to either one of them.
As in the CL-PKE model, the adversary is forbidden from both making
an Extract SEM-key query and making a Replace public key query for
the same identity. We consider two types of adversary, modelling a rogue key
generation centre or any coalition of rogue users.
Type-I adversaries do not have access to the master secret s, but are allowed
to choose any public key to be used for the challenge ciphertext.
Type-II adversaries have access to the master secret s, but only a registered
public key can be used for the challenge ciphertext. (We do not consider a
rogue SEM explicitly since it is weaker than the Type-II adversary.)
4.2 Definition of security
The definition of security follows a well-known pattern in which the adversary
plays a game in two phases against a challenger. In each phase the adversary
is allowed to make queries to the challenger subject to any restrictions. At the
end of the first stage the adversary outputs a pair of plaintexts and an ID, and
the challenger returns the encryption of one of these. At the end of the second
phase the adversary has to output a bit predicting which plaintext was chosen.
It wins the game if it gets the bit correctly. The scheme is secure if no efficient
adversary exists which can win the game with probability significantly bigger
than 1/2. More formally the game proceeds as follows.
Setup: System parameters are generated using the setup procedure of the cryp-
tosystem. The parameters are given to A.
Phase 1: The adversary A is allowed to make any of the queries detailed above.
These queries may be made adaptively.
Challenge phase: The adversary outputs an identity IDch and a pair of plain-
texts m0,m1. If A is a Type-I adversary, it also chooses a public key Pch (by
the last Replace public key query); otherwise, the public key of identity
IDch cannot be replaced. Important restrictions on key extractions include
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disallowing Extract private key query for IDch if A is a Type-II adversary,
and disallowing making both of the Extract SEM-key query and Extract
private key query (which is assumed to be issued implicitly if A has issued
a Replace public key query) for IDch if A is a Type-I adversary. A cipher-
text Cch, which is the encryption of mb (where b is a random bit) under the
public key Pch for IDch, is generated and passed to A.
Phase 2: A can continue to make queries but cannot make both Extract
SEM-key query and Extract private key query for IDch. If A has re-
quested the private key corresponding to the public key Pch, which is regis-
tered as the public key of IDch at the challenge phase, then SEM decrypt
of the challenge ciphertext by the SEM-key corresponding to IDch is not
allowed. On the other hand, A cannot ask a User decrypt query for C ′ch
where C ′ch is the result of SEM decrypt of Cch, if A has requested the SEM-
key corresponding to IDch (which is assumed to be requested implicitly if A
is a Type-II adversary).
Guess: When it has finished with Phase 2, A must output a guess bit b′. A
wins the game if b′ = b and A’s advantage is defined as 2×|Pr[b′ = b]−1/2|.
Definition 1. A security-mediated certificateless encryption scheme is IND-
CCA secure if there is no efficient adversary in the above game with non-
negligible advantage in the security parameter k.
5 Generic Construction from Multiple Encryption
Multiple encryption refers to the encryption of the same piece of data using
multiple and independent encryption schemes. Dodis and Katz [11] proposed a
strong chosen-ciphertext secure multiple encryption (refer to [11] for the secu-
rity definition). We follow their construction and explain our generic security-
mediated certificateless encryption scheme. In essence, the multiple encryption
includes one instance of identity-based encryption (for SEM side) and one in-
stance of public key encryption (for user side). We illustrate our construction
by a bitwise-OR operator instead of the (t, n) threshold secret sharing4 in their
settings. Here the (t, n) notation means at least t+1 decryption keys out of the
set of n decryptions keys can recover the ciphertext from the n-times-encryption.
In the rest of the paper, we will abuse this notation to refer to a similar meaning
that t is the confidentiality threshold of different threshold schemes.
5.1 Encryption algorithm
Setup:
1. On input a security parameter k, execute IBE.Set to generate system para-
meters params and the master-key.
2. Sample H from a family of collision-resistant hash functions.
4 Dodis and Katz’s scheme actually offers four parameters: (tp, tf , tr, tf ), referring to
the threshold for privacy (confidentiality), fault-tolerance, robustness and soundness.
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Set-Private-Key and Set-Public-Key: In this generic construction, this two algo-
rithm may be necessary to combined into one if we treat PKE.Gen as a black-box.
On input a security parameter k, execute PKE.Gen to generate the user’s pub-
lic/private key pair (EK,DK).
Register-Public-Key: Inputs are the public key EK and an identity IDA and the
master secretmaster-key. The SEM− key forA is set asDA = IBE.Extractparams(IDA).
As part of the registration process we assume that A proves the knowledge of
the private key DK corresponding to the registered public key EK.
Encrypt: Inputs are a message M ∈ {0, 1}n, an identity IDA and public key EK.
1. Generate one-time signature keys (SK,VK) using SGen.
2. Choose a random label `.
3. Choose random s1 ∈ {0, 1}n and set s2 =M ⊕ s1.
4. Compute C1 = IBE.Encparams(IDA, s1).
5. Compute C2 = PKE.Enc`EK(s2).
6. Compute α = H(C1, C2, `).
7. Compute the one-time signature σ = SigSK(α).
8. Output the ciphertext C = 〈C1, C2,VK, σ, `〉.
SEM-Decrypt: Inputs are a ciphertext 〈C1, C2,VK, σ, `〉, an identity IDA, a public
key DK and SEM-key DA.
1. Check that IDA is a legitimate user whose key is not revoked.
2. Compute α = H(C1, C2, `).
3. Check that σ is a valid one-time signature on α by VfyVK(α, σ).
4. Output ⊥ if verification fails.
5. Otherwise, compute V ′1 = IBE.DecDA(C1) and output V
′
1 .
User-Decrypt: Inputs are a ciphertext 〈C1, C2,VK, σ, `〉, the token V ′1 from the
SEM, and a secret DK.
1. Compute α and check σ similar to SEM-Decrypt.
2. Output ⊥ if verification fails.
3. Otherwise, compute V ′2 = PKE.Dec
`
DK(C2)
4. Output M ′ = V ′1 ⊕ V ′2 .
5.2 Efficiency and security analysis
Encryption takes the time for an invocation of identity-based encryption and a
public key encryption, together with one signature generation. Decryption by
SEM and the user, apart from signature verification, takes one identity-based
decryption and one public key decryption respectively. The resulting ciphertext’s
length is the total length of the ciphertext produced by identity-based encryption
and public key encryption, together with the verification key of the signature
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algorithm, a hash value and a label employed by the public key encryption. Note
that the use of one-time signature offers fast signature generation/verification.
Due to the page limit we only outline how simulations in the security proof
can be done. From the strong-multiple chosen-ciphertext (SM-CCA) security of
the multiple-encryption scheme [11], it is easy to see that partial decryption by
the SEM and the complete decryption can be supported in the simulation by
querying the decryption oracle of IBE and PKE respectively. Type-I adversary’s
Extract SEM-key and Extract private key queries can be simulated by
the corresponding corruption oracle of IBE and PKE . The success of a Type-
I adversary means breaking the security of either IBE or PKE . For Type-II
adversary, the simulator is only given with PKE and executes IBE.Set itself
instead of relying on any IBE ’s oracles. Simulating in this way makes it possible
to answer the queries revealing the master-key. Since our generic construction is a
(1, 2) instantiation of Dodis and Katz’s scheme, winning the game in the security
proof means the adversary made a successful IBE decryption and a successful
PKE decryption, implying the security of the underlying PKE is broken.
5.3 Distributing the SEMs
Our proposed generic construction can be extended to support distributed SEMs
in two ways. Suppose t out of n shares of SEM-key is needed for a successful
SEM decryption for a particular user. Instead of the above (1, 2) instantiation,
the first method is to instantiate (t, n+1) Dodis-Katz multiple encryption, which
includes n instances of IBE and one instance of PKE, i.e. the ciphertext contains
n ciphertext from IBE and one ciphertext from PKE. Let {IDA} be {(IDA||i), i ∈
{0 · · · 0, 0 · · · 1, 0 · · · 10, · · · , 1 · · · 1}}, i.e. the identity string IDA concatenated by
the binary representations of the integers {1, n}. For the n instances of IBE, we
encrypt n shares produced by a (t, n + 1) secret sharing5, (instead of a (1, 2)
secret-sharing used above) of the message m by the n identities {IDA} and
the remaining share by EK. There are n SEM-keys corresponding to each user,
generated by the KGC according to the identity set {IDA}. Each of n SEMs
holds one of them. For SEM decryption, t SEMs perform decryption of the
corresponding part of the ciphertext, without interacting with other SEMs. After
obtaining these partial decryption results, the user executes PKE.Dec and gets
the final message by the recover algorithm of the (t, n+ 1) secret sharing.
However, this method inherits the linear ciphertext size and the linear num-
ber of encryption from Dodis-Katz’s construction. Hereafter we describe our
second extension to avoid these linear dependencies. Instead of using n identity-
based encryption, we employ a (t, n) identity-based threshold decryption [5], so
essentially we are using something similar to the (1, 2) instantiation of the above
generic method again. Notice that the threshold decryption scheme employed
should spilt the user’s key instead of KGC’s key, in order to support different
threshold settings for different users.
5 Again, four threshold parameters instead of one can be set in the original construc-
tion [11], we only include the confidentiality threshold for the sake of brevity.
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By this approach, we achieve a constant size ciphertext, but the efficiency of
the resulting scheme is still linearly with (and hence highly dependent on) the
decryption efficiency of the underlying identity-based threshold decryption. This
shortcoming motivates our concrete construction in the next section.
6 Our Concrete Scheme from Bilinear Pairings
This section explains our concrete security-mediated certificateless encryption
scheme, followed by discussion on its efficiency and threshold extension.
6.1 Encryption algorithm
Setup:
1. On input a security parameter k, generate system parameters (G1,G2, eˆ)
where G1 and G2 are groups of prime order q and eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is a
pairing. Also choose five hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : {0, 1}n →
Z∗q , H3 : G1 → {0, 1}n, H4 : G2 → {0, 1}n, and H5 : G1×G1×{0, 1}n → G1,
where n is the length of plaintexts. These hash functions will be modelled
as random oracles in order to provide the security proof.
2. Choose an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1.
3. Select a master-key s uniformly at random from Z∗q and set Ppub = sP .
4. Return the master-key and the public system parameters given by
params = 〈G1,G2, eˆ, n, P, Ppub,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5〉.
Set-Private-Key: Choose a secret value xA ∈R Z∗q as the private key of entity A.
Set-Public-Key: Given the private key xA of entity A, set the public key of A to
PA = xAP .
Register-Public-Key: Inputs are the public key PA and an identity IDA and the
master secret s. The SEM-key for A is set as DA = s ·H1(IDA). As part of the
registration process we assume that A proves the knowledge of the value xA such
that PA = xAP .
Encrypt: Inputs are a message M ∈ {0, 1}n−k0 , an identity IDA and public key
PA.
1. Compute QA = H1(IDA).
2. Choose random σ ∈ {0, 1}k0 and set r = H2(M ‖ σ).
3. Compute k = eˆ(QA, Ppub)r, U = rP and U ′ = rPA.
4. Compute V = (M ‖ σ)⊕H3(U ′)⊕H4(k) 6.
5. Compute S = rH5(PA, U, V ).
6. Compute the ciphertext C = 〈S,U, V 〉 ∈ G1 ×G1 × {0, 1}n.
6 CL-PKE in [3] employs a similar “exclusive-or structure” in the ciphertext, which
is exploited by the attack in [21]. However, the non-malleability provided by the S
component protects our scheme from their attack.
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SEM-Decrypt: Inputs are a ciphertext 〈S,U, V 〉, an identity IDA, a public key
PA and SEM-key DA.
1. Check that IDA is a legitimate user whose key is not revoked.
2. Check that eˆ(P, S) = eˆ(U,H5(PA, U, V )).
3. Compute V ′ = V ⊕H4(eˆ(DA, U)) and output V ′.
User-Decrypt: Inputs are a partial ciphertext U , the token V ′ from the SEM,
and a secret xA.
1. Parse M ′ and σ′ from M ′ ‖ σ′ = H3(xAU)⊕ V ′.
2. Verify whether H2(M ′ ‖ σ′) · P = U .
3. If the verification succeeds then output M ′. Else output ⊥.
It is easy to see that the proposed scheme is correct. Consider a valid cipher-
text produced by our scheme; from the bilinearity of pairings, the checking done
in SEM-Decrypt must pass. Consider the decryption step in SEM-Decrypt, we
have eˆ(DA, U)) = eˆ(sQA, rP ) = eˆ(QA, sP )r = eˆ(QA, Ppub)r. For the decryption
step in User-Decrypt, xAU = xArP = rPA. Again, the checking in User-Decrypt
must pass for a valid ciphertext since U = rP . The correctness thus follows.
6.2 Efficiency and security analysis
We make the focus of our comparison on the efficiency of identity-based thresh-
old decryption by Baek and Zheng [5] for the following reasons. First, the second
threshold extension of the generic scheme described in previous section requires
the use of identity-based threshold decryption. To the best of authors’ knowl-
edge, Baek and Zheng [5]’s scheme is the only scheme that separating the private
key of each user into shares instead of the private key of the KGC. Second, a
(1, 2) threshold decryption can be used as an identity-based medicated encryp-
tion (IDME) by delegating one share to the SEM and another to the user.
Since their threshold decryption scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure, the result-
ing IDME offering a similar level of security as ours, in the sense that partial
SEM decryption queries are allowed.
From the Table 2, we can see that our scheme offers a more efficient solution.
In IDME, the checking on the SEM’s decryption is not included as part of the
protocol. As a consequence, the user will not notice if there is something wrong
in the SEM’s decryption. Yet, a zero knowledge proof for the equality of two
discrete logarithms based on bilinear pairings [5, 16] can be used to ensure the
consistency of SEM’s decryption result. The notation (+y) in Table 2 represents
the number of additional operations required if such a proof is employed. In our
proposed scheme, such a zero knowledge proof is not necessary since a mechanism
of consistency checking is already incorporated.
The following theorem summarises the security of our proposed scheme. The
proof can be found in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 1 Our proposed scheme is IND-CCA secure against Type I and Type
II adversary in the random oracle model, under the assumption that the BDH
problem is intractable.
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Encryption Decryption (SEM) Decryption (User)
eˆ(·, ·) Exp Hash eˆ(·, ·) Exp Hash eˆ(·, ·) Exp Hash
IDME 1 3 1 3 (+2) 0 (+1) 1 3 (+2) 0 (+2) 1
Proposed Scheme 1 3 1 3 0 1 0 2 0
Table 2. Efficiency Analysis of Security-Mediated Encryption Schemes
6.3 Distributing SEMs
Since our proposed scheme is built on top of a variant of the identity-based
threshold decryption scheme which is proven to be IND-CCA secure, the exten-
sion of our scheme to support distributed SEMs can be proven to be IND-CCA
secure too. The idea of the extension is as follows. Instead of delegating a single
SEM-key, the SEMs got a (t, n) share D(i)A of the SEM-key DA (by employing the
sharing a point on G sub-routine in [5], which is a simple twist of the Shamir’s
polynomial secret sharing). The partial decryption result to be returned by the
SEMs is no longer the hash value H4(eˆ(D
(i)
A , U)) but eˆ(D
(i)
A , U).
7 And the user
reconstructs all these partial decryption results and performs the final decryp-
tion. As a result, the extended scheme offers higher availability without explicit
replication of SEM-key. Indeed, the major portion of the pairing operations in
our proposed scheme comes from the checking of the validity of ciphertext before
SEM decryption, which is an essential step for the chosen-ciphertext security of
distributed SEMs. Similar to our second extension of our generic construction,
constant size ciphertext is achieved. Moreover, our concrete scheme has a higher
efficiency as shown in Table 2.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduce the notion of security-mediated certificateless (SMC) cryptogra-
phy, which has instantiated one more of the set of compromises within the various
desirable properties for solving the certification problem in public key cryptog-
raphy. We have provided a generic construction and also a concrete encryption
scheme. An attractive feature of our proposal is that it can use the same pa-
rameters used for most other identity-based and share the same key generation
centre (KGC). Our scheme also supports distributed security mediators (SEMs).
A limitation of certificateless encryption (both ours and the original) is that
in its basic form it fails to reach Girault’s level 3 [13]. This means that although
there is less trust placed in the authority than for identity-based schemes (users
do not reveal their private keys to the KGC), there is more trust placed in the
KGC than in traditional public key schemes. This is because if a malicious KGC
distributes a bogus public key for a user, the KGC can obtain secrets intended
for that user even though there is no evidence that can be used to prove that
7 Note that there is no special handling for the simulation of H4 in the security proof.
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the KGC misbehaved. There are ways to achieve level 3 as discussed by Al-
Riyami [1]. One way is to provide a proof of possession of the private key, which
in turn provides the evidence of malicious behaviour if more than one is found.
This can be achieved by providing a signature using the same key.
We discuss some of our future work in SMC cryptography. Naturally it would
be nice to provide a complementary signature scheme with similar properties. We
have a set of candidate signature schemes, including a variant of blind signature
scheme that SEM can blindly issue a partial signature to users. Another challenge
is to design a scheme with all the properties of ours but can achieve the level 3 of
trust refined by Al-Riyami [1]. His work [1] also refined the CBE model [12], and
generic construction of CBE in this new model from CL-PKE is proposed [1,3].
However, their security evidence is questioned recently [15]. It is interesting
to identify the relation between SMC encryption and CBE. Another related
problem is to design SMC encryption without pairing [4].
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